We give four examples of theories in which Kreisel Conjecture is false: 1) the theory P A(−) obtained by adding a function symbol minus, '−', to the language of P A, and the axiom ∀x∀y∀z (x − y = z) ≡ (x = y + z ∨ (x < y ∧ z = 0)); 2) the theory Z of integers; 3) the theory P A(q) obtained by adding a function symbol q (of arity ≥ 1) to P A, assuming nothing about q; 4) the theory P A(N ) containing a unary predicate N (x) meaning 'x is a natural number'. In Section 6 we suggest a counterexample to the so called Sharpened Kreisel Conjecture.
Introduction.
Kreisel's Conjecture (KC) is the following assertion (as quoted by Friedman [1975] ): Let ∀n ψ(n) be a universal sentence of P A. Then if there is some k s.t. for every n ψ(n) is provable in P A in k steps then ∀n ψ(n) is provable in P A. Similarly, we could formulate KC for any formal system S related to arithmetic. The peculiarity of KC lies in the fact that it depends not so much on the logical strength of S, i.e., on how many propositions are provable in S, but on the length of proofs in S and, in particular, on the structure of terms in S. So far, it has been shown that for some theories obtained by weakening 1 of P A, KC is true. Parikh[1978] has shown that KC is true in the theory obtained by replacing the binary function symbols for multiplication and addition by ternary predicates in P A; the result has been extended by Miyatake[1980] to the case where also + is present as a function symbol. Baaz and Pudlák[1993] proved KC for the theory IΣ 1 .
2 Krajíček and Pudlák[1988] proved that KC holds for any finitely axiomatised theory. On the other hand, we can find trivial examples of theories where KC is false, e.g., one obtained by adding every instance of an undecidable Π 1 -sentence as an axiom. Yukami[1978] has shown, using the Matyasievich theorem, that KC is false when we add to P A all the true equations of the form n · m = n · m. The theories that we are going to present will be more natural: the system P A(−) differs from P A only in containing an additional function symbol, minus, which denotes a function definable by a formula already in P A. The theory Z has exactly the same language as P A but it is a natural axiomatisation of the theory of integers. We will show that in those systems we can find k s.t. every sentence of the form n · m = n · m is provable in k steps, which implies that KC is false (as follows from Yukami's argument). The systems P A(q) and P A(N ) will be obtained by weakening the systems P A(−) and Z respectively. Here, KC will be disproved without determining such an upper bound for multiplication, i.e., without bounding proof lengths of the equation n · m = n · m.
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General notions: 1) PA will denote the usual Peano arithmetic.
2) Let T be a theory, ψ a formula and k a number. Then
states that ψ is provable in T in k steps.
3) We assume that P A is formalised using the schemes of identity, i.e., infinitely many axioms x = y → t(z/x) = t(z/y) for every term of P A and x = y → (ψ(z/x) ≡ ψ(z/y)) for every formula of P A.
On the other hand, for the purposes of our construction it would be sufficient to axiomatise identity with the finite list of axioms of the type x = y → S(x) = S(y), and similarly for the other function and predicate symbols. The reason is that an important fragment of the identity schema is derivable from the scheme of induction in a fixed number of steps. The scheme of induction over a language L is the scheme
where ψ is a formula of the language L. The weak identity scheme over L will be the scheme W ID :
where t and ψ is a term resp. a formula of L. Observation: Let L be a language containing the language of P A. There is k ∈ ω s.t. every instance of WID over L is provable in k steps in P A with induction over L.
Proof. The formula ψ(x) := x = 0 → t(x) = t(0) is proved by induction. If
. This is provable in a bounded number of steps, since t(0) = t(0) is obtained by substitution to the formula x = x. Since P A ¬(S(x) = 0), then ψ(S(x)) is provable in a bounded number of steps, and hence also ψ(x) → ψ(S(x)). QED In order to obtain the full identity scheme, it would be sufficient to replace induction by a stronger version
However, it can be shown that the constructions of this paper require only the weak scheme WID.
4)
We shall be dealing with terms recursively defined by a given rule. Those terms will be denoted Q n , Q n m , . . . where the indices range over natural numbers. For example, S n (0) will denote the term S(S(. . . S(0))) where the S's occur n times (this term will be also denoted by n). If ψ(Q n ) is a formula containing the depicted recursive term then
is an abbreviation for the statement 'there exists k such that for every n, T k ψ(Q n )'. Similarly for a greater number of terms possibly with a greater number of indices. As an example we state the following important lemma (see Yukami [1984] ):
Proof. Let ψ(y, x) denote the formula S n (y) + x = S n (y + x). The proof is carried in P A by induction. If x = 0 then ψ(y, 0) = S n (y) + 0 = S n (y + 0) and clearly P A b ψ(y, 0). It can also be shown that P A b ψ(y, x) → ψ(y, S(x)). For assume ψ(y, x). Then we have S n (y) + S(x) = S(S n (y) + x) = S(S n (y + x)) = S n (S(y + x)) = S n (y + S(x)) and hence also ψ(y, S(x)). QED
The following can be obtained from Yukami [1978] and so we just sketch the proof:
Theorem 2 Let T be a consistent recursively axiomatised theory which contains the language of P A and extends P A. Assume that there is k ∈ ω s.t. for every n, m ∈ ω the formula n · m = n · m is provable in T in k steps. Then KC is false in T .
Proof. By the Matyasievich theorem we can find terms of P A, t 1 (x, y 1 , . . . y l ) and t 2 (x, y 1 , . . . y l ) s.t. the formula
is true and undecidable in T . From Lemma 1 every equation of the form n+m = n + m is provable in a bounded number of steps. This, together with the assumption of the theorem, gives an upper bound for the proofs of the instances ψ(n). QED
The theory P A(−)
The theory P A(−) is obtained by adding to P A a new binary function symbol '−' and the axiom
and extending the scheme of induction to the language of P A(−). We are going to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3 There exists a k ∈ ω such that for every n, m
Corollary There is a number k and a formula ψ(x) in the language of P A such that for every n P A(
The point of the construction is the following. For a large term T we are sometimes able to decide in a small number of steps whether it is equal to zero or one, as will be seen below. For example, let T (z) denote the term
Then we can prove the following propositions in a bounded number of steps:
3 The information whether a term equals zero or not does not seem very useful. It may become so if we have a term q(x, y) s.t. q(x, y) = 0 iff x = y. For then if we show that q(t 1 , t 2 ) = 0, in a small number of steps, then we also have t 1 = t 2 in a small number of steps. Minus, as introduced here, enables us to find a term with such a property.
Let the expression t 1 t 2 be an abbreviation for ((t 1 − t 2 ) + (t 2 − t 1 )). We observe the following:
The following is provable in P A(−):
We will show that 2. We shall write t 1 ∼ t 2 , if the terms t 1 and t 2 are identical.
Lemma 5
1.
, for every n.
Proof. 1 With the use of Lemma 1 we obtain 
By Lemma 4 part 1 we conclude
Proof. Let z be a variable not occurring in t and let t :
is an axiom of identity. Applying substitutions x 1 /t 1 and x 2 /t 2 we obtain
. . .
Proof. Let t 1 be the term S m (0) · S(x) and t 2 be the term
We have
By the previous Lemma and Lemma 5, part 4, we obtain
and therefore
The other part of the proposition follows from the fact that Let y := 0. By induction we can prove that for every z,
If z = 0 we have Q(0, 0) = Q(0, 0) + 0 which is true. Assume that the statement holds for z, i.e., Q(0, 0) = Q(0, z) + z. From ( ) we have Q(0, z) = Q(0, S(z)) + 1 and hence
But the proposition ( ) implies that Q(0, 0) ≥ z for every z, which is impossible. QED
The theory P A(q)
Let q be a function symbol of arity ≥ 1. The theory P A(q) will be the theory obtained by adding the symbol q to the language of P A and extending the scheme of induction to the language of P A(q). Hence the only axioms describing the properties of q in P A(q) are those given in the induction and the identity schemes.
Theorem 8 There is a number k and a formula ψ(x) in the language of P A(q) such that for every n P A(q) k ψ(S n (0)) but P A(q) ∀x ψ(x).
Proof. Assume that q is a binary function. The sentence
will be denoted as SU BT R[q]. As in Theorem 2 we can find a formula ψ (x) in the language of P A such that ∀x ψ(x) is not provable in P A (and hence in P A(q)), but the instances are provable in a bounded number of steps, if we have an upper bound on proof-lengths for the equations n · m = n · m. Let ψ(x) be the formula
In every instance of the formula we can assume SU BT R[q] and use q in place of minus as in the previous section. Hence we obtain P A(q) b ψ(S n (0)). The sentence ∀x ψ(x) is not provable in P A(q), since P A(q) is a conservative extension of P A and the formula SU BT R[q] is satisfiable (i.e., every model of P A can be expanded to the model of P A(q) + SU BT R[q]). If q has an arity bigger than two, we can use the term q(x, y, 0, . . . 0) instead. Assume that q is a unary function symbol. In P A we have a binary term OP coding pairs of natural numbers. The previous argument can be applied to the term q (OP (x, y) ). QED
The theory of integers
The function minus, as introduced in section 2, is quite different from the functions definable by terms in P A. Not only it is not increasing but it is also very 'discontinuous'. Note that with minus we have definitions by cases on terms: if we have functions f 1 , f 2 , g 1 , g 2 defined by terms then we also have a term in P A(−) which defines the function h such that h(
, and h(x) = f 2 (x) otherwise. 4 We defined minus in this way because we wanted to have a theory with the same universe as P A. However, this property of minus is not essential in the proof of Theorem 3. We will now show that a similar argument can be applied to the theory of integers, where minus is definable in the natural way.
The theory of integers, Z, is the theory with constant 0, function symbols S, +, · and predicates <, ≤, =. The axioms are the following (we take the leisure to write x > y (≥ y) instead of y < x (≤ x) and abbreviate the bounded quantifiers in the usual way):
and the scheme of induction
IND:
The axioms Q1 -Q7 determine the behavior of S, + and ·; they are the axioms of P A except for the modified axiom Q3 . R8 is the key axiom relating positive and negative numbers. D9 is a definition of ≤. The axioms L10-L11 can be equivalently replaced by axioms asserting that < is a linear ordering and that x < S(x). The motivation for choosing our axiomatisation is the following: axioms preceding L12, except for the definition D9, use the relations <, ≤ only in the context x < 0, x ≤ 0 etc., i.e., we employ only the property 'to be a positive (non-negative) number'. The axiom L10 asserts that the successor of a non-negative number is positive, the axiom L11 says that every number is either positive or non-positive and not both. It is just the last axiom which determines the exact properties of <. Note that there is no function symbol for minus in Z and that the scheme of induction applies only to positive numbers.
Lemma 9 Let ψ be a formula in the language of Z. Then the following are provable in Z:
Proof. It is sufficient to prove part one, the other follows immediately. Reason within
, ii) and IND we obtain ∀x ≥ 0 ψ(x). By L11 it is sufficient to show that ∀x < 0 ψ(x). The following can be easily proved by induction (and the axioms Q4, Q5): Claim. ∀x∀y ≥ 0 x + S(y) = S(x) + y Let ψ (x) be the formula
where z does not occur freely in ψ. Let us show that ∀x ≥ 0 ψ (x). If x = 0 then for every z if z + x = 0 then z = 0, the antecedent is not satisfied and the statement holds. Assume that ψ(x) is true for x ≥ 0. Let us show that ψ(Sx) is true. Let z < 0 be such that z + S(x) = 0. Then S(z) + x = 0 and, by the inductive assumption, we have ψ(S(z)) (more exactly, if S(z) ≥ 0 we have ψ(S(z)) from the first part of the proposition and we use the inductive assumption in the case S(z) < 0) . From iii) we have ψ(z). Hence ψ (S(x)) is true and therefore also ∀x ≥ 0 ψ (x). This, together with axiom R8, gives ∀x < 0 ψ(x). QED
The following proposition serves mainly to convince the reader of the soundness of the system Z.
Proposition 10
The following formulae are provable in Z:
Proof. For 1 proceed as in P A but use IND2 where appropriate. We will prove part ii), the rest is similar. (In order to prove i) note that the statement S(0) = 0 follows from L10 and L11.) Let us first prove that for all x, 0 + x = x. Let ψ(x) be the formula 0 + x = x. If x = 0 the formula holds because of Q4. Let us show that ψ(x) iff ψ(S(x)), for every x. Assume ψ(x). Then 0 + S(x) = S(0 + x) = S(x) and ψ(S(x)) holds. Assume ψ(S(x)). Then 0 + S(x) = S(x) and so S(0 + x) = S(x). By Q1 we have 0 + x = x and ψ(x) holds. By IND2 we then obtain ∀xψ(x). Let now ψ(x) be the formula ∀y x + y = y + x. If x = 0, the formula holds as shown. As in the previous case we can prove that ψ(x) iff ψ(S(x)), for every x and hence ∀xψ(x) holds. 2 The first proposition is straightforward, the second one requires the axiom L10. The next one uses the axiom L11.
3 If x < x then there is z > 0 such that x = x + z. But then (x = x + 0 = x + z) and by 1, iv) we have z = 0. But that is impossible, by axiom L11. The rest follows from the statements already proved.
4 Easy. 5 Let z 0 be such that S(z 0 ) = 0. Then x · S(z 0 ) = 0. But x · S(z 0 ) = x · z 0 + x. If on the other hand x · z + x = 0 for every x then also S(0) · z + S(0) = 0 and hence S(0) · S(z) = 0. But S(0) · S(z) = S(z) and hence S(z) = 0. Therefore z = z 0 . QED We are now going to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 11 There is k such that for every n, m
Corollary There is a number k and a formula ψ(x) in the language of Z such that for every n Z k ψ(S n (0)) but Z ∀x ≥ 0 ψ(x).
Lemma 12 Let T be a theory such that ∃zψ(z) is provable in T . Let T be the extension of T with a new constant symbol c and the axiom ψ(c). Then 1. There exists a function p : ω → ω with the following property: if ξ is a formula in the language of T such that T k ξ then T p(k) ξ 2. Hence if S is a set of formulae in the language of T and k ∈ ω is such that T k ξ for every ξ ∈ S then there is j ∈ ω s.t. T j ξ, for every ξ ∈ S.
Proof. The first part is easy and the other follows. QED
The lemma shows that we can, without significantly shortening the proofs, extend the language of Z by new constant symbols. We shall thus work in the system Z(-1) obtained by adding a new constant -1 to the language of Z together with the axiom ∀x x · (-1) + x = 0 Definition 2
1. The expression t 1 − t 2 will be an abbreviation for t 1 + (-1).t 2 2. The expression t 1 ⊕ t 2 will be an abbreviation for t 1 · t 1 + t 2 · t 2 .
Lemma 13
The following formulae are provable in Z: 
We will show that
The proof proceeds similarly to that one in section 2.
Lemma 14
The following is proved as in Lemma 7: 
The theory P A(N )
Let N (x) be a unary predicate. The expressions ∀x ∈ N ψ(x), ∃x ∈ N ψ(x) will abbreviate the formulae ∀x N (x) → ψ(x), ∃x N (x) ∧ ψ(x) respectively. Let ψ be a formula of P A. Then the relativisation of ψ will be the formula obtained by replacing the quantifiers ∀x, ∃x by ∀x ∈ N , ∃x ∈ N respectively. The theory P A(N ) will be the theory obtained by adding the unary predicate N to the language of P A, its axioms -besides induction -will be the relativisations of axioms of P A, and the induction being replaced by the scheme
where ψ is any formula of P A(N ). The intended meaning of the predicate N is 'is a natural number'. We see that P A is equivalent (meaning mutually interpretable conserving the length of proofs) to the theory P A(N ) plus the axiom ∀x N (x). At the same time the theory P A(N ) can be extended to a theory equivalent to Z, by adding only a finite number of axioms. This fact is used in the following theorem.
Theorem 16 There is a formula ψ(x) in the language of P A(N ) and a number k such that for every n, P A(
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 9. Let κ denote the sentence obtained by the conjunction of the axioms of Z, apart from induction, and the sentence ∀x N (x) ≡ x ≥ 0. Let ψ (x) be as in Theorem 9 and let ψ(x) denote the formula
The theory P A(N ) + κ is equivalent to Z. This is true even in the sense of conserving the lengths of proofs: the lengths of proofs in Z and P A(N ) + κ differ at most by a constant. As shown above Z b ψ (S n (0)) and hence there is a k such that for every n, P A(N ) k ψ(S n (0)). The formula ∀x ∈ N (x) ψ(x) is not provable in P A(N ), for P A(N ) is conservative over P A. QED 6 Modifications of KC.
Let us recall the proposition
of Theorem 8, and let us substitute a binary term t of P A for q. Using the assumption SU BT R[t], the instances of the formula
can be proved in a bounded number of steps. On the other hand, since t is a term of P A, we can also prove ¬SU BT R[t] in P A and hence also ∀xψ(x) is provable in P A. But we must notice that the proof of SU BT R[t] → ψ (x) is very dissimilar from the proofs of its instances: we prove the instances using the assumption SU BT R[t] but we prove the generalization by proving ¬SU BT R[t]. This observation does not contradict KC but it goes very strongly against its spirit: the motivation for believing KC is that we can somehow transform the proofs of the instances to the proof of the generalization. But at least in a naive reading of the phrase 'transformation of the proof' this is not the case.
The same observation applies to the so called Sharpened Kreisel's Conjecture (SKC). SKC asserts, roughly (see, e.g., Krajíček and Pudlák [1988] ), that if ψ(n) can be proved by a short proof for a large n then the proof can be transformed to the proof of the proposition 'the numbers satisfying ψ contain an (infinite) arithmetical sequence'. Depending again on the charitability of the reading of the phrase 'to be transformed', we can give a counterexample to SKC. For take the formula
Using the assumption SU BT R[t] the formula can be proved for every n which is a square in a bounded number of steps. Since ¬SU BT R[t] is provable then ∀xψ(x) is also provable, and hence also the sentence 'the numbers satisfying ψ contain an arithmetical sequence'. However, this proof is 'very different' from the proof of ψ(n), for a square n. The gap between the proofs of the instances and the proof of the generalization would stand out more clearly if we managed to show that formulae of the form ¬SU BT R[t] cannot be proved in P A in a bounded number of steps. For then the instances of ψ(x) would be proved in k steps regardless to the t chosen but the proof of the generalization would have an arbitrary length, as determined by the particular t.
Conjecture. For every k ∈ ω there exists a binary term t of P A s.t. k ¬SU BT R[t]. Corollary 1. There exists k ∈ ω s.t. for every j ∈ ω there exists a formula ψ(x) s.t. the set {n ∈ ω, k ψ(n)} is infinite but the set {n ∈ ω, j ψ(n)} does not contain an arithmetical sequence. 'Proof' Let φ(x) be the formula ∃z x = z · z. There exists k ∈ ω s.t. for every binary term t and every square number n, k SU BT R[t] → φ(n), and k SU BT R[t] → ¬φ(n), if n is not a square. For a given j ∈ ω there exists, by the Conjecture, a binary term t s.t. k+j+5 ¬SU BT R[t]. Let
Then {n ∈ ω, k ψ(n)} is infinite. Assume that the set {n ∈ ω, j ψ(n)} contains an arithmetical sequence. Then there exists a number n which is not a square s.t.
On the other hand, since n is not a square, we have
This altogether gives k+j+5 ¬SU BT R[t], contrary to our assumption. 'QED' Corollary 2. There exists k ∈ ω s.t. for every j ∈ ω there exists a formula ψ(x) s.t. j ∀xψ(x) but k ψ(n) for every n ∈ ω. 'Proof' Let t 1 , t 2 , . . . be a sequence of terms s.t. i ¬SU BT R[t i ]. Let P roof (x, y) be an arithmetical translation of the proposition that the formula with Gödel number y has a proof with x proof lines in P A. Let T i be the theory P A+¬P roof (i, ¬SU BT R[t i ] ). Let us have a sequence of Π 0 -formulas φ 1 (x), φ 2 (x), . . . s.t. ∀xφ i (x) is undecidable in T i . Furthermore, we can bound the complexity of the formulas in such a way that there exists k ∈ ω s.t. for every n and every i if φ i (n) is true then P A k SU BT R[t i ] → φ i (n), and P A k SU BT R[t i ] → ¬φ i (n) otherwise. Since the argument of Theorem 3 can be formalised in P A, we can also assume that for the given k we have
. Then for every n ∈ ω, P A k ψ i (n). Assume that there exists j ∈ ω s.t. for every i P A j ∀xψ i (x). Let i > k + j + 6. There exists a model N of T i and n ∈ N s.t. N |= ¬φ i (n). Hence
From the assumption that P A j ∀xψ i (x) we have also
But this altogether gives
which contradicts the fact that N |= T i . 'QED'
The latter corollary violates the idea of transforming the proofs of the instances to the proof of the generalization, while the first is a refutation of SKC. However, we must note that the Conjecture takes its plausibility from the same intuitions as KC itself. For it seems that for a sufficiently large and chaotic term we cannot prove in a small number of steps that it does not have the property SU BT R. The assumption is a special case of the following general problem. Let us again have the theory P A(q), where q can have arity ≥ 0. We may ask what is the relationship between a formula ψ[q] in the language of P A(q) and the formulae ψ[t] obtained by replacing q by a term t of P A of the same arity. Clearly, it can happen that ψ[q] is not provable in P A(q) while ψ[t] can be proved in P A for every term t (of adequate arity). On the other hand, by the same intuitions that lead us to believing KC we expect that if such a situation occurs then the proofs of ψ[t] must use some specific properties of t and thus have lengths which depends on the complexity of t. If q has arity n ≥ 0, we can formulate an n-modified Kreisel's Conjecture:
Assume that for every n-ary term t of P A the formula ψ[t] is provable in P A in k steps. Then the formula ψ[q] is provable in P A(q).
All the instances of MKC n for n > 0 are equivalent. If n = 0, the assertion is equivalent to the proposition (which may be called 'The Very Weak Kreisel's Conjecture' ):
VWKC Let k ∈ ω. Assume that for every constant term C of P A the formula ψ(C) is provable in P A in k steps. Then the formula ∀xψ(x) is provable in P A.
The VWKC immediately follows from KC. And it seems very straightforward: it seems enough to take for C a sufficiently large and chaotic term. But this is not the case. It can be shown that true equations of the form C = 0, ¬(C = 0), C = 1, ¬(C = 1), for a constant term C, can be proved for even 'very large' and 'very chaotic' terms in a bounded number of steps. (This is somewhat surprising, for all our previous constructions were based on symmetric terms.) Hence we cannot easily rule out the alternative that all true equations of the form C = 0, ¬(C = 0), C = 1, ¬(C = 1) can be proved in a bounded number of steps. This would imply that also the formulae ¬SU BT R[t] can be proved in P A in a bounded number of steps, for binary t (note that necessary conditions for SU BT R[t] are i) t(1, 0) = 0 and ii) t(1, 1) = 0). Hence also our assumption and the conjectures MKC n , n > 0, would be false.
We are here facing a dichotomy, none of whose parts is very favourable for KC: if MKC 1 is true, then the Corollary 1 of our Conjecture frustrates the concept of 'transforming instances to the generalization'. If, on the other hand, MKC 1 is false then it makes our reasons for believing KC even more doubtful: for KC and MKC 1 take their plausibility from essentially the same source.
Is KC true?
We have met two kinds of systems in this paper: one in which we have an upper bound on multiplication and therefore KC is false, and the other where KC is false for a different reason. The following questions therefore do not need to have the same answers: i) is there an upper bound for multiplication in P A? ii) is KC false in P A? If we are allowed to guess, if not to conjecture, then the answer to i) is 'no' and to ii) 'yes'. The reason why we believe that no upper bound for multiplication can be found in P A is roughly this: for a large term t, all the tricks we have tried have helped us to prove in a bounded number of steps only whether t = 0, = 0, = 1, = 1, or some general and not very useful property of t. The point of our preceding construction is that using '-' we convert the apparently useless information t = 0 to the proposition t 1 = t 2 , for some useful t 1 and t 2 . But if we have only terms which provably define increasing functions then the information whether t = 0, = 0, = 1, = 1 is indeed useless. On the other hand, we believe that KC is very likely to be false. Leaving aside the alternative that in P A the upper bound for multiplication can in fact be found, we see that the systems P A(q) and P A(N ) are very close to P A, the system P A(N ) being almost indiscernible from P A. Second, the examples of Section 6 go strongly against the spirit of KC and they could perhaps be converted to a counterexample. Our current inability to find a counterexample may follow merely from our combined inability to determine the lengths of proofs of instances ψ(n) and our lack of techniques for proving the undecidability of ∀n ψ(n).
If, after all, KC is true then our result shows that the proof must concentrate on the specific properties of P A. In the proof it must be relevant that the functions definable by terms in P A are provably increasing, polynomial etc. We cannot hope for a proof that would work independently on the function symbols used, and thus we cannot hope to solve KC by some clever general argument.
We would like to end with a list of problems apparently easier than KC but which could help us understand the function of terms, and perhaps to solve KC itself. Problem 1. In this paper, we have used the schemes of identity (which, as noted in the Introduction, can be replaced by the induction scheme). Can we find a 'natural' extension of P A where KC is false, if only the axioms of identity and the minimumelement scheme are used?
Problem 2. Find a set of true equations on terms with a fixed number of variables (ideally, constant terms) which cannot be proved in a bounded number of steps. For example, the instances of commutativity of large sums or products.
Problem 3.
Prove or disprove the so called Very Weak Kreisel's Conjecture of Section 6.
